教育背景
斯坦福大学经济学博士
中国人民大学经济学硕士
北京大学力学理学士
研究领域
个人简介
叶立新于2001年获得斯坦福大学经济学博士，此后在俄亥俄州立大学经济系历任助理教授、副教授和教授。他现在是香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院经济学教授和深圳高等金融研究院讲座教授，同时兼任经济学博士项目主任。他的研究主攻方向是微观经济学、市场设计、产业组织结构和公司契约理论。他目前的研究聚焦于动态拍卖和非线性定价。
1. “Note on Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for Assembly,” with Xi Shan and Chenglin Zhang, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2024, 26(6): 2231-2236.
2. “Orchestrating Information Acquisition,” with Jingfeng Lu and Xin Feng, American Economic Journals: Microeconomics 2021, 13(4): 420–465.
3. “Collusion through Coordination on Announcements,” with Joseph E. Harrington, Journal of Industrial Economics 2019, 6: 209-241.
4. “Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Radio Spectrum Sharing,” with Chenglin Zhang, Christopher Baker, Joel Johnson, and Huaiyi Wang, International Journal of Industrial Organization 2018,60: 206–227.
5. “Monopolistic Nonlinear Pricing with Consumer Entry,” with Chenglin Zhang, Theoretical Economics 2017, 12: 141–173.
6. “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety,” with Jian Shen and Huanxing Yang, Journal of Industrial Economics 2016, 64(1): 64-108.
7. “Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities,” with Youxin Hu, John Kagel, and Xiaoshu Xu, Games and Economic Behavior 2013,82: 269-291.
8. “Auctions with Entry and Resale,” with Xiaoshu Xu and Dan Levin, Games and Economic Behavior 2013,79: 92-105.
9. “Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Private Information Acquisition Costs,” with Jingfeng Lu, Journal of Economic Theory 2013,148 (1): 393-408.
10. “Auctions with Synergy and Resale,” with Xiaoshu Xu and Dan Levin, International Journal of Game Theory 2012,41 (2): 397-426.
11. “Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice,” with Massimo Morelli and Huanxing Yang, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2012, 4(1): 142-175.
12. “Quality Disclosure and Competition,” with Dan Levin and James Peck, Journal of Industrial Economics 2009, 57 (1): 167-196.
13. “Nonlinear Pricing, Market Coverage, and Competition,” with Huanxing Yang, Theoretical Economics 2008, 3: 123-153.
14. “Search with Learning: Understanding Asymmetric Price Adjustments,” with Huanxing Yang, The RAND Journal of Economics 2008, 39: 547-564.
15. “Hybrid Auctions Revisited,” with Dan Levin, Economics Letters 2008, 99: 591-594.
16. “Trademark Sales, Entry, and the Value of Reputation,” with Howard Marvel, International Economic Review 2008, 49: 547-576.
17. “Indicative Bidding: An Experimental Analysis,” with John Kagel and Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Games and Economic Behavior 2008, 62: 697-721.
18. “Survival Auctions,” with John Kagel and Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Economic Theory 2007, 33: 103-119.
19. “Reserve Price Signaling,” with Hongbin Cai and John Riley, Journal of Economic Theory 2007, 135 (1): 253-268.
20. “Bad News Can Be Good News: Early Dropouts in an English Auction with Multi-dimensional Signals,” with Dan Levin and James Peck, Economic Letters 2007, 95: 462-467.
21. “Indicative Bidding and A Theory of Two-Stage Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior 2007, 58 (1): 181-207.
22. “On the Use of Customized vs. Standardized Performance Measures,” with Anil Arya, Jonathan Glover, and Brian Mitterdorf, Journal of Management Accounting Research 2005,17: 7-21.
23. “Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry,” Contributions to Theoretical Economics 2004, 4(1): Article 8, 1-27.
24. “Deciding Between Competition and Collusion,” with Patrick Bajari, Review of Economics and Statistics 2003, 85(4): 971-989.
